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The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem.
It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative
behaviour by the agents. We examine computational and non-computational aspects of strategising under
the PS rule. Firstly, we study the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We
present polynomial-time algorithms for optimal manipulation. Secondly, we show that expected utility best
responses can cycle. Thirdly, we examine the existence and computation of Nash equilibrium profiles under
the PS rule. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. For two agents,
we identify two different types of preference profiles that are not only in Nash equilibrium but can also be
computed in linear time. Finally, we conduct experiments to check the frequency of manipulability of the
PS rule under different combinations of the number of agents, objects, and utility functions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnu-
merical Algorithms and Problems—Computations on discrete structures; I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]:
Distributed Artificial Intelligence—Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences—Economics
General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: fair division, strategyproofness, random assignment, probabilistic serial
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1. INTRODUCTION
The assignment problem is one of the most fundamental and important problems in
economics and computer science [see e.g., Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Ga¨rdenfors
1973; Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979; Aziz et al. 2013b; Saban and Sethuraman 2013a].
Agents express preferences over objects and, based on these preferences, the objects
are allocated to the agents. A randomized or fractional assignment rule takes the pref-
erences of the agents into account in order to allocate each agent a fraction of the
object. If the objects are indivisible, the fraction can also be interpreted as the proba-
bility of receiving the object. Randomization is widespread in resource allocation since
it is one of the most natural ways to ensure procedural fairness [Budish et al. 2013].
Randomized assignments have been used to assign public land, radio spectra to broad-
casting companies, and US permanent visas to applicants [Footnote 1 in Budish et al.
2013].
Typical criteria for randomized assignment being desirable are fairness and wel-
fare. The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is an ordinal randomized/fractional assignment
rule that fares better on both counts than any other random assignment rule [Bogo-
molnaia and Heo 2012; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Budish et al. 2013; Katta and
Sethuraman 2006; Kojima 2009; Yilmaz 2010; Saban and Sethuraman 2013b]. In par-
ticular, it satisfies strong envy-freeness and efficiency with respect to both stochastic
dominance (SD) and downward lexicographic (DL) relations [Bogomolnaia and Moulin
2001; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Kojima 2009]. SD is one of the most fundamental
relations between fractional allocations because one allocation is SD-preferred over
another iff for any utility representation consistent with the ordinal preferences, the
Emails: haris.aziz@nicta.com.au, sergeg@cse.unsw.edu.au, Nicholas.Mattei@nicta.com.au,
ninan@cs.toronto.edu, toby.walsh@nicta.com.au
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former yields at least as much expected utility as the latter. DL is a refinement of SD
and based on lexicographic comparisons between fractional allocations. Generaliza-
tions of the PS rule have been recommended in many settings [see e.g., Budish et al.
2013]. The PS rule also satisfies some desirable incentive properties. If the number
of objects is not more than the number of agents, then PS is weak strategyproof with
respect to stochastic dominance [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001]. However, PS is not
immune from manipulation.1
PS works as follows. Each agent expresses linear orders over the set of houses (we
use the term house throughout the paper though we stress any object could be allo-
cated with these mechanisms). Each house is considered to have a divisible probabil-
ity weight of one, and agents simultaneously and with the same speed consume the
probability weight of their most preferred house. Once a house has been consumed,
the agent proceeds to eat the next most preferred house that has not been completely
consumed. The procedure terminates after all the houses have been consumed. The
random allocation of an agent by PS is the amount of each object he has eaten.2
We examine the following natural questions for the first time: what is the computa-
tional complexity of an agent computing a different preference to report so as to get a
better PS outcome? How often is a preference profile manipulable under the PS rule?.
3 The complexity of manipulation of the PS rule has bearing on another issue that
has recently been studied—preference profiles that are in Nash equilibrium. Ekici and
Kesten [2012] showed that when agents are not truthful, the outcome of PS may not
satisfy desirable properties related to efficiency and envy-freeness. Because the PS
rule is manipulable it is important to understand how hard, computationally, it is for
an agent to compute a beneficial misreporting as this may make it difficult in prac-
tice to exploit the mechanism. It is also interesting to identify preference profiles for
which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to gain utility with respect to
his actual preferences. Hence, we consider the following problem: for a preference pro-
file, does a (pure) Nash equilibrium exist or not and if it exists how efficiently can it be
computed?
In order to compare random allocations, an agent needs to consider relations be-
tween random allocation. We consider three well-known relations between lotter-
ies [see e.g., Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Saban and
Sethuraman 2013b; Cho 2012]: (i) expected utility (EU), (ii) stochastic dominance (SD),
and (iii) downward lexicographic (DL). For EU, an agent seeks a different allocation
that yields more expected utility. For SD, an agent seeks a different allocation that
yields more expected utility for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal prefer-
ences. For DL, an agent seeks an allocation that gives a higher probability to the most
preferred alternative that has different probabilities in the two allocations. Through-
out the paper, we assume that agents express strict preferences, i.e., they are not in-
different between any two houses.
Contributions. We initiate the study of computing best responses and checking for
Nash equilibrium for the PS mechanism — one of the most established randomized
rules for the assignment problem. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
1Another well-established rule random serial dictator (RSD) is strategyproof but it is not envy-free and not
as efficient as PS [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001]. Moreover, in contrast to PS, the fractional allocations
under RSD are #P-complete to compute [Aziz et al. 2013a].
2Although PS was originally defined for the setting where the number of houses is equal to the number of
agents, it can be used without any modification for fewer or more houses than agents [see e.g., Bogomolnaia
and Moulin 2001; Kojima 2009].
3This problem of computing the optimal manipulation has already been studied in great depth for voting
rules [see e.g., Faliszewski and Procaccia 2010; Faliszewski et al. 2010].
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the DL best response for multiple agents and houses. The algorithm works by care-
fully simulating the PS rule for a sequence of partial preference lists. For the case of
two agents4, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an EU best response
for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. The result for the EU best
response relies on an interesting connection between the PS rule and the sequential
allocation rule for discrete objects. We leave open the problem of computing the ex-
pected utility response for arbitrary number of agents. The fact that a similar problem
has also remained open for sequential allocation [Bouveret and Lang 2011] gives some
indication of the challenge of the problem.
We then examine situations in which all agents are strategic. We first show that
expected utility best responses can cycle. Nash dynamics in matching theory has been
active area of research especially for the stable matching problem [see e.g., Ackermann
et al. 2011]. We then prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium exists for any number of
agents and houses. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of the existence
of a Nash equilibrium for the PS rule. For the case of two agents we present two differ-
ent linear-time algorithms to compute a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium
with respect to the original preferences. One type of equilibrium profile results in the
same assignment as the one by original profile.
Finally, we perform an experimental study of the frequency of manipulability of the
PS mechanism. We investigate, under a variety of utility functions and preference
distributions, the likelihood that some agent in a profile has an incentive to misreport
his preference. The experiments identify settings and utility models in which PS is less
susceptible to manipulation.
2. PRELIMINARIES
An assignment problem (N,H,) consists of a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of
houses H = {h1, . . . , hm} and a preference profile = (1, . . . ,n) in which i denotes
a complete, transitive and strict ordering on H representing the preferences of agent
i over the houses in H. Since each i will be strict throughout the paper, we will also
refer to it simply as i.
A fractional assignment is a (n×m) matrix [p(i)(j)] such that for all i ∈ N , and hj ∈
H, 0 ≤ p(i)(j) ≤ 1; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∑i∈N p(i)(j) = 1 The value p(i)(j) is the
fraction of house hj that agent i gets. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(1), . . . , p(i)(m)) represents
the allocation of agent i. A fractional assignment can also be interpreted as a random
assignment where p(i)(j) is the probability of agent i getting house hj . We will also
denote p(i)(j) by p(i)(hj).
Relations between random allocations. A standard method to compare lotter-
ies is to use the SD (stochastic dominance) relation. Given two random as-
signments p and q, p(i) SDi q(i) i.e., a player i SD prefers allocation p(i)
to q(i) if
∑
hj∈{hk:hkih} p(i)(hj) ≥
∑
hj∈{hk:hkih} q(i)(hj) for all h ∈ H and∑
hj∈{hk:hkih} p(i)(hj) >
∑
hj∈{hk:hkih} q(i)(hj) for some h ∈ H.
Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) DLi q(i) i.e., a player i DL prefers
allocation p(i) to q(i) if p(i) 6= q(i) and for the most preferred house h such that p(i)(h) 6=
q(i)(h), we have that p(i)(h) > q(i)(h).
When agents are considered to have cardinal utilities for the objects, we denote by
ui(h) the utility that agent i gets from house h. We will assume that total utility of an
agent equals the sum of the utilities that he gets from each of the houses. Given two
4The two-agent case is also of special importance since various disputes arise between two parties.
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random assignments p and q, p(i) EUi q(i) i.e., a player i EU (expected utility) prefers
allocation p(i) to q(i) iff
∑
h∈H ui(h)p(i)(h) >
∑
h∈H ui(h)q(i)(h).
Since for all i ∈ N , agent i compares assignment p with assignment q only with
respect to his allocations p(i) and q(i), we will sometimes abuse the notation and use
p SDi q for p(i) SDi q(i). A random assignment rule takes as input an assignment
problem (N,H,) and returns a random assignment which specifies how much fraction
or probability of each house is allocated to each agent.
3. THE PROBABILISTIC SERIAL RULE AND ITS MANIPULATION
Recall that the Probabilistic Serial (PS) rule is a random assignment algorithm in
which we consider each house as infinitely divisible. At each point in time, each agent
is consuming his most preferred house that has not completely been consumed and
each agent has the same unit speed. Hence all the houses are consumed at time m/n
and each agent receives a total of m/n unit of houses. The probability of house hj being
allocated to i is the fraction of house hj that i has eaten. The PS fractional assignment
can be computed in time O(mn). We refer the reader to [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001]
or [Kojima 2009] for alternative definitions of PS. The following example adapted from
[Section 7, Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001] shows how PS works.
Example 3.1 (PS rule). Consider an assignment problem with the following pref-
erence profile.
1: h1, h2, h3 2: h2, h1, h3 3: h2, h3, h1
Agents 2 and 3 start eating h2 simultaneously whereas agent 1 eats h1. When 2 and 3
finish h2, agent 3 has only eaten half of h1. The timing of the eating can be seen below.
0 1
2
Time
134
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
h1
h2
h2
h1
h1
h3
h3
h3
h3
The final allocation computed by PS is PS(1,2,3) =
(
3/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/2 1/4
0 1/2 1/2
)
.
Consider the assignment problem in Example 3.1. If agent 1 misreports his pref-
erences as follows: ′1: h2, h1, h3, then PS(′1,2,3) =
(
1/3 1/2 1/6
1/3 1/2 1/6
1/3 0 2/3
)
. Then, if
u1(h1) = 7, u1(h2) = 6, and u1(h3) = 0, then agent 1 gets more expected utility when
he reports ′1. In the example, although truth-telling is a DL best response, it is not
necessarily an EU best response for agent 1.
Examples 1 and 2 of [Kojima 2009] show that manipulating the PS mechanism can
lead to an SD improvement when each agent can be allocated more than one house.
In light of the fact that the PS rule can be manipulated, we examine the complex-
ity of a single agent computing a manipulation, in other words, the best response for
the PS rule.5 We then study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria. For
E ∈ {SD,EU,DL}, we define the problem EBESTRESPONSE: given (N,H,) and agent
5Note that if an agent is risk-averse and does not have information about the other agent’s preferences, then
his maximin strategy is to be truthful. The reason is that if all all agents have the same preferences, then
the optimal strategy is to be truthful.
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i ∈ N , compute a preference ′i for agent i such that there exists no preference ′′i
such that PS(N,H, (′′i ,−i)) Ei PS(N,H, (′i,−i)). For a constant m, the problem
EBESTRESPONSE can can be solved by brute force by trying out each of the m! prefer-
ences. Hence we won’t assume that m is a constant.
We establish some more notation and terminology for the rest of the paper. We will
often refer to the PS outcomes for partial lists of houses and preferences. We will de-
note by PS(Li ,−i)(i), the allocation that agent i receives when his preferences are
restricted to the list L where L is an ordered list of a subset of houses. When an agent
runs out of houses in his preference list, he does not eat any other houses. The length
of a list L is denoted |L|, and we refer to the kth house in L as L(k). In the PS rule,
the eating start time of a house is the time point at which the house starts to be eaten
by some agent. In Example 3.1, the eating start times of h1, h2 and h3 are 0, 0 and 0.5,
respectively.
4. LEXICOGRAPHIC BEST RESPONSE
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for DLBESTRESPONSE. Lex-
icographic preferences are well-established in the assignment literature [see e.g., Sa-
ban and Sethuraman 2013b; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Cho 2012]. Let (N,H,)
be an assignment problem where N = {1, . . . , n} and H = {h1, . . . , hm}. We will show
how to compute a DL best response for agent 1 ∈ N . It has been shown that when
m ≤ n, then truth-telling is the DL best response but if m > n, then this need not be
the case [Saban and Sethuraman 2013b; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Kojima 2009].
Recall that a preference ′1 is a DL best response for agent 1 if the fractional alloca-
tion agent 1 receives by reporting ′1 is DL preferred to any fractional allocation agent
1 receives by reporting another preference. That is, there is no preference ′′1 such
that his share of a house h when reporting ′′1 is strictly larger than when reporting′1 while the share of all houses he prefers to h (according to his true preference 1) is
the same whether reporting ′1 or ′′1 .
Our algorithm will iteratively construct a partial preference list for the i most pre-
ferred houses of agent 1. Without loss of generality, denote 1: h1, h2, . . . , hm.
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote Hi = {h1, . . . , hi}. A (partial) preference of agent 1
restricted to Hi is a preference over a subset of Hi. Note that a preference for Hi need
not list all the houses in Hi. For the preference of agent 1 restricted to Hi, the PS rule
computes an allocation where the preference of agent 1 is replaced with this preference
and the preferences of all other agents remain unchanged. Recall that agent 1 can
only be allocated a non-zero fraction of a house if this house is in the preference list
he submits. The notions of DL best response and DL preferred fractional assignments
with respect to a subset of houses Hi are defined accordingly for restricted preferences
of agent 1.
For a house h ∈ H, let PS1(L, h) denote the fraction of house h that the PS rule
assigns to agent 1 when he reports the (partial) preference L.
We start with a simple lemma showing that a DL best response for agent 1 for the
whole set H can be no better and no worse on Hi than a DL best response for Hi.
LEMMA 4.1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. A DL best response for agent 1 on H gives the same
fractional assignment to the houses in Hi as a DL best response for agent 1 on Hi.
PROOF. We have that a preference for agent 1 on Hi can be extended to a preference
for all houses that gives the same fractional allocation to agent 1 for the houses in Hi.
Namely, the remaining houses H \Hi can be appended to the end of his preference list,
giving the same allocation to the houses in Hi as before.
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On the other hand, consider a DL best response ′1 for agent 1 on H, giving a frac-
tional allocation p to agent 1. Restricting this preference to Hi gives a fractional allo-
cation q for Hi. If q is DL preferred to p|Hi , i.e., the fractional allocation p restricted
to Hi, then q = p|Hi , otherwise we would have a contradiction to ′1 being a DL best
response as per the previous argument that we can extend any preference for Hi to H
giving the same fractional allocation to agent 1 for the houses in Hi.
Our algorithm will compute a list Li such that Li ⊆ Hi.6 The list Li will be a DL best
response for agent 1 with respect to Hi. Suppose the algorithm has computed Li−1.
Then, when considering Hi = Hi−1∪{hi}, it needs to make sure that the new fractional
allocation restricted to the houses in Hi−1 remains the same (due to Lemma 4.1). For
the preference to be optimal with respect to Hi, the algorithm needs to maximize the
fractional allocation of hi to agent 1 under the previous constraint.
Our algorithm will compute a canonical DL best response that has several additional
properties.
Definition 4.2. A preference Li for Hi is no-0 if Li contains no house h with
PS1(Li, h) = 0.
Any DL best response for agent 1 for Hi can be converted into a no-0 DL best response
by removing the houses for which agent 1 obtains a fraction of 0.
Definition 4.3. For a no-0 preference Li for Hi, the stingy ordering for a position j is
determined by running the PS rule with the preference Li(1)⊕ · · · ⊕Li(j− 1) for agent
1 where ⊕ denotes concatenation. It orders the houses from ⋃|Li|k=j Li(k) by increasing
eating start times, and when 2 houses h, h′ have the same eating start time, we order
h before h′ iff h 1 h′.
Intuitively, houses occurring early in this ordering are the most threatened by the
other agents at the time point when agent 1 comes to position j. The following defini-
tion takes into account that the eating start times of later houses may change depend-
ing on agent 1’s ordering of earlier houses.
Definition 4.4. A preference Li for Hi is stingy if it is a no-0 DL best response for
agent 1 on Hi, and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, Li(j) is the first house in the stingy ordering
for this position such that there exists a DL best response starting with Li(1) ⊕ · · · ⊕
Li(j).
We note that, due to Lemma 4.1, there is a unique stingy preference for each Hi.
Example 4.5. Consider the following assignment problem.
1: h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 2: h3, h6, h4, h5, h1, h2
The preferences h3, h1, h4, h2 and h3, h2, h4, h1 are both no-0 DL best responses for agent
1 with respect to H4, allocating h1(1), h2(1), h3(1/2), h4(1/2) to agent 1. When running
the PS rule with h3 as the preference list, h4’s eating start time comes first among
{h1, h2, h4}. However, there is no DL best response for H4 starting with h3, h4. The next
house in the stingy ordering is h1. The preference h3, h1, h4, h2 is the stingy preference
for H4.
The next lemma shows that when agent 1 receives a house partially (a fraction differ-
ent from 0 and 1) in a DL best response, a stingy preference would not order a less
preferred house before that house.
6When we treat a list as a set we refer to the set of all elements occurring in the list.
Technical Report: January 2014.
Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule 7
LEMMA 4.6. Let Li be a stingy preference for Hi. Suppose there is a hj ∈ Hi such
that 0 < PS1(Li, hj) < 1. Then, P ⊆ Hj , where Li = P ⊕ hj ⊕ S.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction, assume P contains a house hk such that hj 1
hk (i.e., j < k). Let K denote all houses hk in P such that hj 1 hk. Since Li is no-0,
PS1(Li, hk) > 0 for all hk ∈ K. But then, removing the houses in K from Li gives a
preference that is strictly DL preferred to Li since this increases agent 1’s share of hj
while only the shares of less preferred houses decrease. This contradicts Li being a DL
best response for Hi, and therefore proves the lemma.
The next lemma shows how the houses allocated completely to agent 1 are ordered in
a stingy preference.
LEMMA 4.7. Let Li be a stingy preference for Hi. If hj , hk ∈ Hi are two houses such
that PS1(Li, hj) = PS1(Li, hk) = 1, with Li = P ⊕ hj ⊕M ⊕ hk ⊕ S, then either the
eating start time of hj is smaller than hk ’s eating start time when agent 1 reports P , or
it is the same and hj 1 hk.
PROOF. Suppose not. But then, Li is not stingy since swapping hj and hk in Li gives
the same fractional allocation to agent 1.
We now show that when iterating from a set of houses Hi−1 to Hi, the previous solution
can be reused up to the last house that agent 1 receives partially.
LEMMA 4.8. Let Li−1 and Li be stingy preferences for Hi−1 and Hi, respectively.
Suppose there is a h ∈ Hi−1 such that 0 < PS1(Li−1, h) < 1. Then the prefixes of Li−1
and Li coincide up to h.
PROOF. Suppose not. By Lemma 4.1, PS1(Li, h) = PS1(Li−1, h). Let Pi−1 = Pi
denote a maximum common prefix of Li−1 and Li, and write Li−1 = Pi−1 ⊕ xi−1 ⊕
Mi−1 ⊕ h ⊕ Si−1 and Li = Pi ⊕ xi ⊕Mi ⊕ h ⊕ Si. By Lemma 4.6, h 1 hi, and there-
fore, hi ∈ Si. Since Li−1 and Li are no-0, we have that PS1(Li−1, xi−1) > 0 and
PS1(Li, xi) > 0. Now, if PS1(Li−1, xi−1) < 1, then since at least one other agent eats
xi−1 concurrently with agent 1 when he reports Li−1, he loses a non-zero fraction of
xi−1 when instead he reports Li and eats xi after having exhausted Pi, we have that
PS1(Li, xi−1) < PS1(Li−1, xi−1), a contradiction to Lemma 4.1. Similarly, we obtain
a contradiction when PS1(Li, xi) < 1. Therefore, PS1(Li−1, xi−1) = PS1(Li, xi) = 1.
Now, by Lemma 4.1, we also have that PS1(Li−1, xi−1) = PS1(Li, xi) = 1. But only one
of xi, xi−1 can come earlier in the stingy ordering. The other one contradicts Lemma
4.7.
We are now ready to describe how to obtain Li from Li−1. See Algorithm 1 for the
pseudocode. The subroutine EST(N,H,) executes the PS rule for (N,H,) and for
each item, records the first time point where some agent starts eating it. It returns the
eating start times est(h) for each house h ∈ H.
Let p be the last position in Li−1 such that the house Li−1(p) is partially allocated
to agent 1. In case agent 1 receives no house partially, set p := 0 and interpret Li−1(p)
as an imaginary house before the first house of Li−1. By Lemma 4.8, we have that
Li−1(s) = Li(s) for all s ≤ p. By Lemma 4.1, we have that the fractional assignment
resulting from Li must wholly allocate all houses Li−1(p+ 1), . . . , Li−1(|Li−1|) to agent
1, and allocate a share of 0 to all houses in Hi−1 \ Li−1.
It remains to find the right ordering for {Li−1(s) : p + 1 ≤ s ≤ |Li−1|} ∪ {hi}. By
Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, the prefixes of Li−1 and Li coincide up to h. We will describe in the
next paragraph how to determine the position q where hi should be inserted. Having
determined this position one may then need to re-order the subsequent houses. This
is because inserting hi in the list may change the eating start times of the subsequent
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Input: (N,H,)
Output: DL Best response of agent 1
1 L1 ← h1 // Best response for agent 1 w.r.t. H1 = {h1}
2 for i = 2 to n do // Compute a best response w.r.t. H2, . . . , Hn
3 p← 0
4 if ∃q ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} such that 0 < PS1(Li−1, Li−1(q)) < 1 then
5 p← max{q ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} : 0 < PS1(Li−1, Li−1(q)) < 1}
6 end if
7 for q ← p + 1 to |Li|+ 1 do // New house hi inserted after position p
8 Lqi ← Li−1(1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Li−1(q − 1)⊕ hi
9 while |Lqi | ≤ |Li−1| do // Complete the list according to the stingy ordering
10 est← EST(N,H, (Lqi ,2, . . . ,n))
11 S ← {h ∈ Li−1 \ Lqi : est(h) is minimum}
12 hs ← first house among S in 1
13 Lqi ← Lqi ⊕ hs
14 end while
15 if PS1(Lqi , hi) = 0 then
16 Lqi ← Li−1
17 end if
18 end for
19 q ← p // Determine which Lqi is stingy
20 worse[p− 1]← true
21 finished← false
22 while finished = false do
23 if ∃h ∈ Hi−1 such that PS1(Lqi , h) 6= PS1(Li−1, h) then
24 worse[q]← true
25 q ← q + 1
26 else
27 worse[q]← false
28 if PS1(Lqi , h1) > 0 and PS1(L
q
i , h1) < 1 then
29 if worse[q − 1] = false then
30 q ← q − 1
31 end if
32 finished← true
33 else if PS1(Lqi , h1) = 1 then
34 est← EST(N,H, (Lqi (1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Lqi (q − 1),2, . . . ,n))
35 if ∃h ∈ {Lqi (q + 1), . . . , Lqi (|Lqi |)} such that est(h) ≤ est(hi) then
36 q ← q + 1
37 else
38 finished = true
39 end if
40 end if
41 end if
42 end while
43 Li ← Lqi
44 end for
45 return Ln
Algorithm 1: DL best response for n agents
houses. This leads us to the following insertion procedure. The list Lqi obtained from
Li−1 by inserting hi at position q, with p < q ≤ |Li|+ 1, is determined as follows. Start
with Lqi := Li−1(1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ Li−1(q − 1) ⊕ hi. While |Lqi | ≤ |Li−1|, we append to the end
of Lqi the first house among Li−1 \ Lqi in the stingy ordering for this position. After the
while-loop terminates, run the PS rule for the resulting list Lqi . In case we obtain that
PS1(Lqi , hi) = 0, we remove hi again from this list (and actually obtain L
q
i = Li−1).
The position q where hi is inserted is determined as follows. Start with q := p. We
have an array worse keeping track of whether the lists Lpi , . . . , L
i
i produce a worse out-
come for agent 1 than the list Li−1. Set worse[p − 1] := true. As long as the list Li has
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not been determined, proceed as follows. Obtain Lqi from Li−1 by inserting hi at po-
sition q, as described earlier. Consider the allocation of agent 1 when he reports Lqi .
If this allocation is not the same for the houses in Hi−1 as when reporting Li−1, then
set worse[q] := true, otherwise set worse[q] := false. If worse[q], then increment q. This
is because, by Lemma 4.1, this preference would not be a DL best response with re-
spect to Hi. Otherwise, if 0 < PS1(Lqi , hi) < 1, then we can determine hi’s position. If
worse[q − 1], then set Li := Lqi , otherwise set Li := Lq−1i . This position for hi is opti-
mal since moving hi later in the list would decrease its share to agent 1. Otherwise,
we have that worse[q] = false and PS1(Lqi , hi) ∈ {0, 1}. This will be the share agent 1
receives of hi. If PS1(Lqi , hi) = 0, then set Li := Li−1. Otherwise (PS1(L
q
i , hi) = 1), it
still remains to check whether the current position for hi gives a stingy preference. For
this, run the PS rule with the preference Lqi (1)⊕· · ·⊕Lqi (q−1) for agent 1. If hi’s eating
start time is smaller than the eating start time of each house Lqi (r) with r > q, then
set Li := Lqi , otherwise increment q.
Thus, given Li−1, the preference Li can be computed by executing the PS rule O(m)
times. The DL best response computed by the algorithm is Lm. Since the PS rule can
be implemented to run in linear time O(nm), the running time of this DL best response
algorithm is O(nm3).
THEOREM 4.9. DLBESTRESPONSE can be solved in O(nm3) time.
Example 4.10. Consider the following instance.
1: h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9, h10
2: h8, h3, h5, h2, h10, h1, h6, h7, h4, h9
3: h9, h4, h7, h1, h2, h6, h5, h3, h8, h10
After having computed L2 = h1, h2, the algorithm is now to consider H3. Since
PS1(L2, h1) = PS1(L2, h2) = 1, the algorithm first considers L13 = h3, h2, h1. Note
that h1 and h2 have been swapped with respect to L2 since agent 2 starts eating h2
before agent 3 starts eating h1 when agent 1 reports the preference list consisting
of only h3. It turns out that PS1(L13, h1) = PS1(L13, h2) = PS1(L13, h3) = 1. Thus,
worse[1] = false. Since h3 does not come first in the stingy ordering, the algorithm
needs to verify whether moving h3 later will still give a DL best response with respect
to H3. It then considers L23 = h1, h3, h2. However, this allocates only half of h3 to agent
1, implying worse[2] = true. Since worse[1] = false, the algorithm sets L3 = L13. The DL
best response computed by the algorithm is L10 = h3, h2, h1, h6.
0 13 1
4
3 2
7
3
9
3
10
3
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
h1
h5
h1
h1
h2
h5
h8
h11
h2
h6
h8
h11
h4
h6
h9
h12
h4
h7
h9
h12
h3
h7
h10
h13
h3
h4
h10
h13
1: h1, h2, h3, h4, . . . 2: h5, h6, h7, h2, h4, h14 . . .
3: h1, h8, h9, h10, h3, . . . 4: h1, h11, h12, h13, . . .
Fig. 1: Illustration of constructing a DL best response for agent 1 for the preference
profile specified above.
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Example 4.11. Figure 1 depicts how the DL best response of agent 1 looks like.
After h1 is inserted, the starting eating time h3 is before h4. But after h2 is inserted in
to form L2, then the starting eating time of h4 comes before h3 because agent 2 won’t
be able to eat h2. After h4 is inserted to build L4, it turns out that agent 2 will not be
able to eat h4 at all. That is why h2 is shaded in the eating line of agent 2 because it
will already be eaten by the time agent 2 considers eating it at time 10/3.
The DL optimal best response algorithm carefully builds up the DL optimal prefer-
ences list while ensuring it is stingy.
We note that a DL best response is also an SD best response. A best response was
defined as a response that is not dominated. Hence a DL-best response is one which
no other response DL-dominates. This means that no other response SD-dominates (as
DL is a refinement of SD) it. Hence, a DL best response is also a SD best response. One
may wonder whether an algorithm to compute the DL best response also provides us
with an algorithm to compute an EU best response. However, a DL best response may
not be an EU best response for three or more agents. Consider the preference profile in
Example 3.1. Since the number of houses is equal to the number of agents, reporting
the truthful preference is a DL best response [Schulman and Vazirani 2012]. However,
we have shown a different preference for agent 1 where he may obtain higher utility.
5. EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE
In this section we present an algorithm to compute an EU best response for two agents
for the PS rule. First, we reveal a tight connection between a well-known mechanism
for sequential allocation of indivisible houses and the PS mechanism (Section 5.1).
Then we demonstrate how the expected utility best response algorithm for the sequen-
tial allocation of indivisible houses proposed by Kohler and Chandrasekaran [1971]
can be used to build a best response for the PS algorithm (Section 5.2).
5.1. A connection between allocation mechanisms for divisible and indivisible houses
We can obtain the same allocation given by the PS algorithm using the alternation
policy, which is a simple mechanism for dividing discrete houses between agents. The
alternating policy lets the agents take turns in picking the house that they value most:
the first agent takes his most preferred house, then the second agent takes his most
preferred house from the remaining houses, and so on. We use the notation 1212 . . . to
denote the alternation policy. To obtain the allocation of the PS algorithm using the
alternation policy we split our houses into halves and treat them as indivisible houses
and adjust agents’ preferences over these halves in a natural way.
Recall that H = {h1, . . . , hm} is the set of houses. Assume 2: h1, . . . , hm and the
preference of agent 1 is a permutation of h1, . . . , hm as follows 1: hpi(1), . . . , hpi(m). We
denote i(k) the kth preferred house of the agent i, and by −11 (hi) we mean the
position of hi in 1.
We split each house hi, i = 1, . . . ,m, into halves and treat these halves as indi-
visible houses. Given hi, we say that h1i and h2i are two halves of hi. Given the set
of houses H, we denote HCLONED the set of all halves of all houses in H, so that
HCLONED = {h11, h21, . . . , h1m, h2m}. Given 1 and 2, we introduce profiles CLONED1 andCLONED2 that are obtained by straightforward splitting of houses into halves in 1 and2: CLONED1 = h1pi(1), h2pi(1), . . . , h1pi(m), h2pi(m) and CLONED2 = h11, h21, . . . , h1m, h2m. We call this
transformation the order-preserving bisection.
Definition 5.1. Let s be a preference over a subset of half-houses S ⊆ HCLONED.
The preference s has the consecutivity property if and only if −1s (h1i ) + 1 = −1s (h2i )
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for all pairs h1i , h2i ∈ S. In other words, all half-houses of the same house are ranked
consecutively in s.
The preference s= h11, h12, h22, h13, h23 has the consecutivity property over the set S ={h11, h12, h22, h13, h23}, while s= h11, h12, h13, h22, h23 does not since h12  h13  h22. We observe
that CLONED1 and CLONED2 that are obtained from 1 and 2 using the order-preserving
bisection, respectively, have the consecutivity property.
Next, we define the order-preserving join operation. It is the reverse operation for
the order-preserving bisection. Given a preference CLONEDs of the order-preserving
join operation merges all halve houses that are ordered consecutively into a single
house and leaves the other houses unchanged. Applying the order-preserving join to
CLONEDs = h11, h21, h12, h13, h23, h22. gives s= h1, h12, h3, h22.
Next, we show the main result of this section. The outcome of the alternation policy
over CLONED1 and CLONED2 is identical to the outcome of PS over 1 and 2, whereCLONED1 and CLONED2 are obtained by the order-preserving bisection from 1 and 2. In
the alternation policy 12, . . . , 12 we call a pair of consecutive steps 12 a round.
LEMMA 5.2. The allocation obtained by the PS algorithm over the preferences 1
and 2 of length m is the same as the allocation obtained by the alternation policy of
length 2m over the preferences CLONED1 and CLONED2 .
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the number of steps of the PS rule. A step
in the PS rule starts when agent 1 starts eating a house and finishes when agent 1
finishes eating that house. For the base case, at time point 0, both the PS algorithm
and the alternation policy have not allocated a house to any agent.
Suppose the statement holds for i−1 steps of the PS rule, where i ≥ 1. If both agents
have the same most preferred house hk among the remaining houses, then each of
them gets half of this house in the PS rule. Consider the next round of the alternation
policy: agent 1 gets a half of hk, h1k and agent 2 gets the other half of hk, h
2
k. Hence, the
allocation is the same.
If the most preferred houses of the two agents are different, say the most preferred
house among the remaining houses of agent 1 is hj , and the most preferred of agent 2
is hk, then agent 1 completely receives house hj and agent 2 completely receives house
hk in step i of the PS rule. In the alternation policy, agent 1 gets h1j , h2j and agent 2 gets
h1k, h
2
k in the next two rounds. Hence, the allocation is the same.
Example 5.3. Consider two agents with preferences 1= h5, h6, h1, h3, h4, h2 and
2= h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6. The allocation obtained by the PS algorithm over 1 and 2
is PS(1,2) =
(
0 0 1/2 1/2 1 1
1 1 1/2 1/2 0 0
)
. The identical allocation given by the alternation
policy with CLONED1 and CLONED2 is
Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6
h15 h
2
5 h
1
6 h
2
6 h
1
3 h
1
4
h11 h
2
1 h
1
2 h
2
2 h
2
3 h
2
4
.
5.2. Computing an EU best response
In this section we present an algorithm to compute an expected utility best response
for the PS mechanism. First, we recap our settings. We are given two agents 1 and 2
with profiles 1 and 2, respectively, over houses in H. We assume that agent 1 plays
strategically and agent 2 plays truthfully. The goal is to find an expected utility best
response for agent 1 for the PS rule. To do so, we reuse an EU best response for the
alternation policy over split houses, CLONED1 and CLONED2 . Our algorithm is based on
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Input: ({1, 2}, H, (1,2)) where 2: h1,2 . . . ,2 hm
Output: Best response BEST1 of agent 1
1 Construct order-preserving bisection of 1 and 2: CLONED1 and CLONED2 .
2 Run Kohler and Chandrasekaran’s algorithm for two agents with preferences CLONED1 and CLONED2 and
use the alternation policy. We obtain CLONED-BEST1 .
3 if CLONED-BEST1 does not satisfy consecutivity then
4 Let W be a set of half-houses such that agent 1 gets a half-house h1 but does not get h2.
5 for all h1 ∈W do
6 Suppose agent 2 gets h2 in the ith round.
7 Move h1 at the ith position in CLONED-BEST1 .
8 end for
9 for all h1 ∈W do
10 Rank h2 right after h1 in CLONED-BEST1 .
11 end for
12 end if
13 Use order-preserving join to obtain BEST1 from CLONED-BEST1
14 return BEST1
Algorithm 2: EU best response for 2 agents
the following lemma. Let CLONED-BEST1 be an expected utility best response for agent 1
to CLONED2 for the alternation policy.
LEMMA 5.4. Suppose CLONED-BEST1 has the consecutivity property. Then, BEST1 , ob-
tained by the order-preserving join from CLONED-BEST1 is an EU best response to 2.
PROOF. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, BEST1 ′ is EU preferred to BEST1 .
We transform BEST1 ′ into CLONED-BEST1 ′ using the order-preserving bisection. By
Lemma 5.2, if we run the alternation policy over CLONED-BEST1 ′ and CLONED2 , the agents
get the same allocation as by running PS. Hence, CLONED-BEST1 is not the best response
to CLONED2 . This leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 5.4 suggests a straightforward way to compute agent 1’s best response BEST1
for the PS algorithm. We run Kohler and Chandrasekaran’s algorithm that finds a best
response for the alternation policy given agents’ preferences CLONED1 and CLONED2 . IfCLONED-BEST1 has the consecutivity property then we can use the order-preserving join to
obtain BEST1 which is the expected utility best response to 2 in PS by Lemma 5.4. The
main problem with this approach is that the algorithm of Kohler and Chandrasekaran
[1971] may return CLONED-BEST1 that does not have the consecutivity property (we pro-
vide such an example in the full report). However, we show in Algorithm 2 that we
can always find another expected utility best response CLONED-BEST1 ′ that has the con-
secutivity property. We need to delay the allocation of some half-houses that agent 1
gets. The modifications of the best response CLONED-BEST1 in lines 3–12 produce another
best response that has the consecutivity property for agent 1. A detailed description
of the algorithm from [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] and a proof of correctness of
Algorithm 2 can be found in the full report.
Remark 5.5. The EU best response algorithm is independent of particular utilities
and holds for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. Since PS for two
agents only involves fractions 0, 12 , and 1, a DL best response is also equivalent to
an EU best response. Hence we have proved that the DL best response algorithm in
Section 4 is also an EU best response algorithm for the case of two agents.
6. NASH DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIUM
In contrast to the previous sections where a single agent is strategic, we consider the
setting when all the agents are strategic. We first prove that for expected utility best
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responses, the preference profile of the agents can cycle when agents have Borda utili-
ties. This means that it is possible that self interested agents, acting unilaterally, may
never stop reacting.
THEOREM 6.1. With 3 agents and 6 items where agents have Borda utilities, a series
of expected utility best responses by the agents can lead to a cycle in the profile.
Using a computer program we have found a sequence of best response that cycle.
Checking the existence of a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium appears
to be a challenging problem. The naive way of checking existence of Nash equilibrium
requires going through O(m!n) profiles, which is super-polynomial even when n = O(1)
or m = O(1). Although computing a Nash equilibrium is a challenging problem, we
show that at least one (pure) Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for any number of
houses, any number of agents, and any preference relation over fractional allocations.7
The proof relies on showing that the PS rule can be modelled as a perfect information
extensive form game.
THEOREM 6.2. A pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule
for any number of agents and houses, and for any relation between allocations.
PROOF SKETCH. Let t0, . . . , tk be the k+1 different time steps in the PS algorithm.
Let g = GCD({ti+1 − ti : i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}}) where GCD denotes the greatest com-
mon divisor. The time interval length g is small enough such that the PS rule can be
considered to have m/g stages of duration g. Each stage can be viewed as having n
sub-stages so that in each stage, agent i eats g units of a house in sub-stage i of a
stage. In each sub-stage only one agent eats g units of the most favoured house that
is available. Hence we now view PS as consisting of a total of mn/g sub-stages and
the agents keep coming in order 1, 2, . . . , n to eat g units of the most preferred house
that is still available. If an agent ate g units of a house in a previous sub-stage then it
will eat g units of the same house in the next sub-stage as long as the house has not
been fully eaten. Consider a perfect information extensive form game tree. For a fixed
reported preference profile, the PS rule unravels accordingly along a path starting at
the root and ending at a leaf. Each level of the tree represents a sub-stage in which a
certain agent has his turn to eat g units of his most preferred available house. Note
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the paths in the tree and the ways
the PS algorithm can be implemented, depending on the reported preference.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for such a game via
backward induction: starting from the leaves and moving towards the root of the tree,
the agent at the specific node chooses an action that maximizes his utility given the
actions determined for the children of the node. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
identifies at least one such path from a leaf to the root of the game. The path can be
used to read out the most preferred house of each agent at each point. The information
provided is sufficient to construct a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium.
Those houses that an agent did not eat at all can conveniently be placed at the end
of the preference list. Such a preference profile is in Nash equilibrium. Hence, a pure
Nash equilibrium exists under the PS rule.
We also know that DL-Nash equilibrium is an SD-Nash equilibrium because if there
is an SD deviation, then it is also a DL deviation. Our argument for the existence of
a Nash equilibrium is constructive. However, naively constructing the extensive form
game and then computing a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium requires exponential
space and time. It is an open question whether a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium or
7We already know from Nash’s original result that a mixed Nash equilibrium exists for any game.
Technical Report: January 2014.
14 H. Aziz et al.
for that matter any Nash equilibrium preference profile can be computed in polynomial
time. We can prove the following theorem for the “threat profile” whose construction is
shown in Algorithm 3.
THEOREM 6.3. Under PS and for two agents, there exists a preference profile that is
in DL-Nash equilibrium and results in the same assignment as the assignment based
on the truthful preferences. Moreover, it can be computed in linear time.
PROOF. The proof is by induction over the length of the preference lists constructed.
The main idea of the proof is that if both agents compete for the same house then they
do not have an incentive to delay eating it. If the most preferred houses do not coincide,
then both the agents get them with probability one but will not get them completely if
they delay eating them.
Let the original preferences of agent 1 and agent 2 be represented by lists P1 and
P2. We present an algorithm to compute preferences Q1 and Q2 that are in DL-Nash
equilibrium. Initialise Q1 and Q2 to empty lists. Now consider the maximal elements h
from P1 and h′ from P2. Element h is appended to the list Q1 and h′ is appended to the
list Q2. At the same time h is deleted from P1 and h′ is deleted from P2. Now if h 6= h′,
then h′ is appended to Q1 and h′ is appended to Q2. The process is repeated until Q1
and Q2 are complete lists and P1 and P2 are empty lists. The algorithm is described as
Algorithm 3.
We now prove that P1 is a DL best response against P2 and P2 is a DL best response
against P1. The proof is by induction over the length of the preference lists. For the
first elements in the preference lists P1 and P2, if the elements coincide, then no agent
has an incentive to put the element later in the list since the element is both agents’
most preferred house. If the maximal elements do not coincide i.e. h 6= h′, then 1 and
2 get h and h′ respectively with probability one. However they still need to express
these houses as their most preferred houses because if they don’t, they will not get the
house with probability one. The reason is that h is the next most preferred house after
h′ for agent 2 and h′ is the next most preferred house after h for agent 1. Agent 1 has
no incentive to change the position of h′ since h′ is taken by agent 2 completely before
agent 1 can eat it. Similarly, agent 2 has no incentive to change the position of h since
h is taken by agent 1 completely before agent 2 can eat it. Now that the positions of h
and h′ have been completely fixed, we do not need to consider them and we reason in
the same manner over the updated lists P1 and P2.
The desirable aspect of the threat profile is that since it results in the same assign-
ment as the assignment based on the truthful preferences, the resultant assignment
satisfies all the desirable properties of the PS outcome with respect to the original
preferences. Due to Remark 5.5, we get the following corollary.
COROLLARY 6.4. Under PS and for 2 agents, there exists a preference profile that is
Nash equilibrium for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. Moreover it
can be computed in linear time.
In this next example, we show how Algorithm 3 is used to compute a preference
profile that is in DL-Nash equilibrium. The example also shows that it can be the case
that one preference profile is in DL-Nash equilibrium and the other is not, even if both
profiles yield the same outcome.
Example 6.5 (Computing a threat profile).
1: h1, h2, h3, h4 2: h2, h3, h1, h4
We now use Algorithm 3 to compute a preference profile (′1,′2) that is in DL-
Nash equilibrium: ′1= h1, h2, h3, h4 and ′2= h2, h1, h3, h4. Note that PS(′1,′2) =
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Input: ({1, 2}, H, (1,2))
Output: The “threat profile” (Q1, Q2) where Qi is the preference list of agent i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1 Let Pi be the preference list of agent i ∈ {1, 2}
2 Initialise Q1 and Q2 to empty lists.
3 while P1 and P2 are not empty do
4 Let h = first(P1) and h′ = first(P2)
5 Append h to Q1; Append h′ to Q2
6 Delete h from P1; Delete h′ from P2
7 if h 6= h′ then
8 Append h′ to Q1; Append h to Q2;
9 end if
10 end while
11 return (Q1, Q2).
Algorithm 3: Threat profile DL-Nash equilibrium for 2 agents (which also is an EU
Nash equilibrium)(
1 0 1/2 1/2
0 1 1/2 1/2
)
. Although PS(1,2) = PS(′1,′2), we see that (′1,′2) is in DL-
Nash equilibrium but (1,2) is not!
Next we show how our identified links with sequential allocation allocation of indi-
visible houses leads us to another Nash equilibrium profile called the crossout profile.
The algorithm to compute the crossout profile is stated as Algorithm 4.
Input: ({1, 2}, H, (1,2))
Output: The “crossout profile” (Q1, Q2) where Qi is the preference list of agent i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1 Let P ′i be the order-preserving bisection of preference list of agent i ∈ {1, 2}
2 Initialise Q′1 and Q
′
2 to empty lists.
3 while P ′1 and P ′2 are not empty do
4 Let h = last(P ′1); Prepend h to Q
′
2; Delete h from P
′
1 and P
′
2;
5 Let h = last(P ′2); Prepend h to Q
′
1; Delete h from P
′
1 and P
′
2;
6 end while
7 extend Q′1 and Q
′
2 to have the consecutivity property but the same allocation.
8 change Q1 and Q′2 via order-preserving join of Q
′
1 and Q
′
2.
9 return (Q1, Q2).
Algorithm 4: Crossover profile DL-Nash equilibrium for 2 agents (which also is an EU
Nash equilibrium)
In Algorithm 4, the Nash equilibrium problem for PS is changed into the same prob-
lem for sequential allocation by changing each house into a half house. The idea behind
the crossout profile for the sequential allocation setting is that no agent will choose
the least preferred object unless it is the only object left. Thus agent 2 will be forced
to get the least preferred object of agent 1 [Levine and Stange 2012; Kohler and Chan-
drasekaran 1971]. In Algorithm 4, we use this idea recursively to build sequences of
objects Q′1 and Q′2 for each agent that are allocated to them. If one agent gets a half
house and the other agent gets the other half house, it can be proved that the positions
of the half houses in Q′1 and Q′2 are same. This sequence of objects for each agent are
then extended to preferences that give the same allocations under sequential alloca-
tion and which also satisfy the consecutivity property. The preferences for sequential
allocation are then transformed via order-preserving join to obtain the crossover Nash
equilibrium profile for the PS rule. By Lemma 5.4, the preference profile is in Nash
equilibrium. Next we show that the threat profile and crossout profile are different
and may also give different assignments.
Technical Report: January 2014.
16 H. Aziz et al.
Example 6.6 ( Crossout profile). Consider the following profile.
1: h1, h2, h3, h4 2: h2, h3, h1, h4
We now use Algorithm 4 to compute a preference profile (′1,2)′ that is in DL-
Nash equilibrium where ′1= h2, h1, h4, h3 and ′2= h2, h3, h4, h1. Note that PS(′1,′2
) =
(
1 1/2 0 1/2
0 1/2 1 1/2
)
. The crossout Nash equilibrium profile is different from the threat
Nash equilibrium profile for the problem instance.
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium profile for more than two agents
still remains open. However we have presented a positive result for two agents — a
case which captures various fair division scenarios.
7. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we examine the likelihood that at least one agent would have an incen-
tive to misreport his preferences to get more expected utility. To gain insight into this
issue we have performed a series of experiments to determine the frequency that, for a
given number of agents and houses, a profile will have a beneficial strategic reporting
opportunity for a single agent. 8
In order to preform this experiment we need to generate preferences and utilities
for each of the agents. We consider two different models to generate profiles. (i) In
the Impartial Culture (IC) model, the assumption is that for each agent and a given
number of houses, each of the |H|! preference orders over the houses is equally likely
( 1|H|! ). (ii) In the Uniform Single Peaked (USP), the assumption is that all single peaked
preference profiles are equally likely. Single peaked preferences are a profile restriction
introduced by Black [1948] and well studied in the social choice literature. Informally,
in a single peaked profile, given all possible 3-sets of houses, no agent ever ranks some
particular house last in all 3 sets that it appears.
In order to evaluate if an agent has a better response we need to assign utilities
to the individual houses for each agent. While there are a number of ways to model
utility we have selected the following mild restrictions on utilities in order to gain
an understanding of the manipulation opportunities. (i) In the Random model, we
uniformly at random generate a real number between 0 and 1 for each house that is
compatible with the generated preference order. We normalize these utilities such that
each agent’s utility sums to a constant value that is the same for all agents. In our
experiments each agent’s utility sums to the number of houses in the instance. (ii) In
the Borda model, we assign |H|−1 utility to the first house, |H|−2 to the second house,
down to 0 utility for the least preferred house. (iii) In the Exponential (Exp) model, we
assign utility 2|H|−1 to the first house, 2|H|−2 to the second house, down to 0 utility for
the least preferred house.
We generated for each pair in |N | = {1, . . . , 8}×|H| = {1, . . . , 8} 1,000 profiles accord-
ing to a utility and preference distribution. For each of these instances, we searched to
see if any agent could get more utility by misreporting his preferences, if so, then we
say that profile admitted a manipulation. Figure 2 show the percentage of instances
that were manipulable for each of the domain, utility, number of agent, and number of
house combinations (Borda is omitted for space).
Looking at Figure 2, we observe that as the utility and preference models become
more restrictive, the opportunities for a single agent to manipulate becomes smaller.
8Independent from our work, Philipp [2013] also examined how susceptible PS can be to manipulation.
Hugh-Jone et al. [2013] conducted laboratory experiments which do look at the manipulability of PS math-
ematically but according to the strategic behaviour of humans.
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The Random-IC experiment yields the most frequently manipulable profiles, strictly
dominating all the other runs of the experiment for every combination except one
(Random-USP with 3 houses and 3 agents). Each experiment with single peaked pref-
erences (save one) is dominated by the experiment with the unrestricted preference
profiles for the same utility model.
Fig. 2: Heatmap showing the percentage of manipulable instances for Random Utility
and the Single Peaked Random Utility models on the left and Exponential Utility and
the Single Peaked Exponential Utility models on the right.
The PS rule is strategyproof with respect to the DL relation in the case where the
number of agents and the number of houses are equal. Our experiment with the Exp
model (which is similar to the DL relation but not exact) found no manipulable in-
stances when the number of agents is less than or equal to the number of houses. It
is encouraging that the manipulation opportunities for Exp-USP are so low. In this
setting each agent is valuing the houses along the same axis of preference and prefers
their first choice exponentially more than their second choice. As the number of houses
relative to the number of agents grows, the opportunities to manipulate increase, max-
imizing around 99%.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We conducted a detailed computational analysis of strategic aspects of the PS rule.
Our study leads to a number of new research directions. PS is well-defined even for
indifferences [Katta and Sethuraman 2006]. It will be interesting to extend our results
for strict preferences to the case with ties. Two interesting problems are still open.
Firstly, What is the complexity of computing an expected utility best response for more
than two agents? The problem is particularly intriguing because even for the related
and conceptually simpler setting of discrete allocation, computing an expected utility
best response for more than two agents has remained an open problem [Bouveret and
Lang 2011]. Another problem is the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium for
more than two agents. It will also be interesting to examine coalitional manipulations
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and coalitional Nash equilibria. Finally, an analysis of Nash dynamics under the PS
rule is an intriguing research problem.
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A. PSEUDOCODE OF PS
We write the formal definition of PS from [Kojima 2009] as an algorithm. For any
h ∈ H ′ ⊂ H, let N(h,H ′) = {i ∈ N : a i b for every b ∈ H ′} be the set of agents whose
most preferred house in H ′ is h. PS is defined as Algorithm 5.
Input: (N,H,)
Output: p the random assignment returned by PS
1 s←− 0 (s is the stage of the algorithm)
2 HO ←− H; t0 ←− 0; p0ih ←− 0 for all i ∈ N and h ∈ H.
3 while Hs 6= ∅ do
4 ts+1(h) = sup{t ∈ [0, |H|] :∑i∈N psih + |N(h,Hs)|(t− ts) < 1}
5 ts+1 ←− minh∈Hs ts(h)
6 Hs = Hs \ {h ∈ Hs−1 : t(h) = ts}
7 for all i ∈ N and h ∈ H do
8 if i ∈ N(h,Hs) then
9 ps+1ih ←− psih + ts+1 − t(s)
10 else
11 ps+1ih ←− psih
12 end if
13 end for
14 s←− s+ 1
15 end while
16 return p = ps
Algorithm 5: PS
B. EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE FOR THE ALTERNATION POLICY
In this section we recall the best response algorithm proposed in [Kohler and Chan-
drasekaran 1971] as we will use it to derive the best response algorithm for the PS
algorithm.
We denote the algorithm from [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971]
BESTEURESPONSEALGO. In particular, we describe BESTEURESPONSEALGO
for the special case ki = 1 and ni = 2 so that we follow the alternation policy. We also
assume that the number of houses is even as this is sufficient for our purposes. These
restrictions simplify the algorithm.
Following Kohler and Chandrasekaran [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971], we use
a matrix V = Vi,j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . ,m, where Vi,j represents the utility value that the
i-th player will gain if he selects the hj object. In our case, we assume that Vi,j = ui,j ,
i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . ,m, such that ui,j ∈ R and ui,j > ui,j′ iff hj i hj′ . As 2 ranks houses
hj , j = 1, . . . ,m, lexicographically, we have V2,j ≥ V2,j+1, j = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Algorithm 6
shows a pseudocode for the simplified version of BESTEURESPONSEALGO.
We refer to Jk as an ordered set formed at the kth stage of BESTEURESPONSEALGO.
The ordered set Jm/2 is the optimal set of houses for agent 1 to choose, and agent
1 must choose them in the lexicographic order. We denote BESTEURESPONSE =
BESTEURESPONSEALGO(V ). Note that the number of houses in BESTEURESPONSE
is m/2.
Example B.1. Consider two agents with preferences 1= h5, h6, h1, h3, h4, h2 and
2= h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6. First, we form a matrix V . We select arbitrary numbers ui,j
that satisfy conditions above, e.g.
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Input: (Vi,j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . ,m)
Output: the set of houses allocated to agent 1 as a result of his best response.
1 for k ∈ [1,m/2] do
2 Ik ←− {h2k−1, h2k}
3 end for
4 if −11 (h1) < −11 (h2) then
5 J1 ←− {h1}
6 else
7 J1 ←− {h2}
8 end if
9 for k ∈ [2,m/2] do
10 Jk ←− {h2k−1, h2k}
11 end for
12 J
1 ←− J1
13 for k ∈ [2,m/2] do
14 J
k ←− {hj |hj ∈ Jk−1 ∪ Jk;V1j ≥ kth maximal of {V1l|hl ∈ Jk−1 ∪ Jk}}
15 end for
16 return Jm/2.
Algorithm 6: BESTEURESPONSEALGO for sequential allocation for two agents
V =
(
4 1 3 2 6 5
6 5 4 3 2 1
)
The following table shows an execution of the algorithm on this example over profiles
1 and 2.
I1 I2 I3
{h1, h2} {h3, h4} {h5, h6}
J1 J2 J3
{h1} {h3, h4} {h5, h6}
J
1
J
2
J
3
{h1} {h1, h3} {h1, h5, h6}
Table I: An execution of BESTEURESPONSEALGO on Example B.1.
BESTEURESPONSE = J3 = {h1, h5, h6}.
Given BESTEURESPONSE we define a profile that corresponds to the best response
BEST1 . By BESTEURESPONSE(i) we refer to the house at the ith position. First, we rank
houses in BESTEURESPONSE in the same order as they occur in BESTEURESPONSE,
so that BEST1 = (BESTEURESPONSE(1), . . . ,BESTEURESPONSE(m/2). Then, after
BESTEURESPONSE(m/2), we rank houses that agent 2 gets in the same order as agent
2 obtains them. In Example B.1, BEST1 = h1, h5, h6, h2, h3, h4.
C. A BEST RESPONSE WITHOUT THE CONSECUTIVITY PROPERTY (EXAMPLE)
Next we provide an example that shows that a best response returned by Algorithm 6
over CLONED1 and CLONED2 might not have the consecutivity property.
Example C.1. Consider two agents from Example 5.3. We re-
call that if we split all houses into halves then we obtain pro-
files: CLONED1 = h15, h25, h16, h26, h11, h21, h13, h23, h14, h24, h12, h22 and CLONED2 =
h11, h
2
1, h
1
2, h
2
2, h
1
3, h
2
3, h
1
4, h
2
4, h
1
5, h
2
5, h
1
6, h
2
6.
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A matrix V is the following
V =
(
4 4 1 1 3 3 2 2 6 6 5 5
6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
)
Table II shows an execution of BESTEURESPONSEALGO over profiles CLONED1
and CLONED2 . BESTEURESPONSE = J
6
= {h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26}. We extend
BESTEURESPONSE with houses that are not allocated to agent 1 and obtain
CLONED-BEST1 = h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26, h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24.
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
{h11,h21} {h12,h22} {h13,h23} {h14,h24} {h15,h25} {h16,h26}
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6
{h11} {h12,h22} {h13,h23} {h14,h24} {h15,h25} {h16,h26}
J
1
J
2
J
3
J
4
J
5
J
6
{h11} {h11,h12} {h11,h13,h23} {h11,h13,h23,h14} {h11,h13,h23,h15,h25} {h11,h13,h15,h25,h16,h26}
Table II: An execution of BESTEURESPONSEALGO over profiles CLONED1 and CLONED2 .
Unfortunately, CLONED-BEST1 does not have the consecutivity property and Lemma 5.4
can not be applied. Note that agent 2 gets {h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}.
In the next section, we show that we can always find another CLONED-BEST1 that has
the consecutivity property.
D. EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE FOR THE PS MECHANISM (FULL PROOF).
In this section, we demonstrate that given CLONED1 and CLONED2 we can always find
the expected utility best response to CLONED2 that has the consecutivity property. To
do so, we first run BESTEURESPONSEALGO to obtain BESTEURESPONSE. Then we
demonstrate that it can be modified and extended to a profile over HCLONED that has
the consecutivity property.
Given BESTEURESPONSE, we denote the ordered set of houses allocated to agent
j BEST-ALLOCj , j = 1, 2. Note that BEST-ALLOC1 = BESTEURESPONSE. Then
BEST-ALLOC1(i) and BEST-ALLOC2(i) are houses that are allocated to agent 1 and
agent 2, respectively, in the ith round of the alternation policy.
Example D.1. Consider Example C.1.
BEST-ALLOC1 = {h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26}.
and
BEST-ALLOC2 = {h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}.
We say that BEST-ALLOC has the consecutivity property iff for all h1i , h2i ∈
BEST-ALLOC, h1i and h2i are ordered consecutively. We say that a half-house of hi is
allocated to agent 1 if and only if agent 1 gets h1i and agent 2 gets h2i . We say that a
full-house hi is allocated to agent 1 if and only if agent 1 gets h1i and h2i .
In the proof we often consider an ordered set of houses {hji1 , . . . , hjip} that obeys the
following property: {hji1 2 . . . 2 hjip}. We will say these houses are lexicographically
ordered as agent 2 orders his houses w.r.t. the lexicographic order by our assumption
in Section 5.1.
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First, we give an overview of the construction. Our construction is motivated by an
observation that if BEST-ALLOC1 and BEST-ALLOC2 have the consecutivity property
and half houses are obtained by agent 1 and 2 at the same round then it is straightfor-
ward to extend BEST-ALLOC1 to CLONED-BEST1 over HCLONED that has the consecutivity
property. Consider the following example.
Example D.2. Suppose BEST-ALLOC1 = {h12, h22, h13, h14, h24, h16} and BEST-ALLOC2 ={h11, h21, h23, h15, h25, h26}. Note that half-houses are allocated in the same rounds in
BEST-ALLOC1 and BEST-ALLOC2. The 1st agent expected utility best response profile
isCLONED-BEST1 = h12, h22, h13, h14, h24, h16, h11, h21, h23, h15, h25, h26. Note thatCLONED-BEST1 does not
have consecutivity property.
Next we demonstrate how to change CLONED-BEST1 so that it has the consecutivity
property and leads to the same allocation. For each half house h1i allocated to agent 1
we rank h2i right after h1i . We keep houses that are not allocated to agent 1 in the end of
the profile. In this example, we rank h23 and h26 after h13 and h16, respectively. We obtain
the following profile: CLONED-BEST1 = h12, h22, h13,h23, h14, h24, h16,h26, h11, h21, h15, h25. Note that
inserting h2i after h1i does not change the allocation as we know that h2i is allocated to
agent 2 at the same round as h1i is allocated to agent 1. Hence, h2i will never be the
top element for agent 1 at any round and CLONED-BEST1 ′ gives the same allocation as
BEST-ALLOC1.
Based on this observation, the goal of the construction is to transform BEST-ALLOC1
is such a way that half houses of hi that are allocated to different agents are al-
located to them in the same round while preserving allocations of both agents. To
do so, we prove that an allocation of half houses and full houses in an execution
of BESTEURESPONSEALGO follows simple patterns. The first property concerns full
houses : halves of full houses allocated to an agent are always allocated in consecutive
rounds. The second key property concerns half houses. Let HGj = {hji1 , . . . , hjip} be the
lexicographically ordered set of half houses allocated to agent j, j = 1, 2. Then alloca-
tion of half houses obeys the following order: agent 1 gets h1i1 at round kt1 then, possibly
in later round k′t1 , agent 2 gets h
2
i1
. Next, agent 1 gets h1i2 at round kt2 then, possibly in
later round k′t2 , agent 2 gets h
2
i1
, and so on. In other words, half houses are allocated
to agents in lexicographic order and each half houses is allocated to both agents before
the next half houses is allocated. Based on these properties, we will prove that we can
delay an allocation of h1ih to agent 1 till round k
′
th
and preserve the allocations.
We need to prove several useful properties of BESTEURESPONSE.
The next proposition states that if only half of hi is allocated to agent 1(2) then this
half is h1i (h2i ). We use this observation to simplify notations.
PROPOSITION D.3. If hji is allocated to agent 1 and h
j%2+1
i is allocated to agent 2
then h1i is allocated to agent 1 and h2i is allocated to agent 2.
PROOF. Follows from BESTEURESPONSEALGO and CLONED1 as between h1i and h2i
agent 1 always prefers h1i .
The next lemma shows that for all full houses allocated to i, both halves are allocated
in consecutive rounds.
PROPOSITION D.4. If a full-house of hi is allocated to 1(2) then h1i and h2i are allo-
cated to 1(2) in two consecutive rounds.
PROOF. For agent 1 it follows from construction of BEST-ALLOC1 in
BESTEURESPONSEALGO. For agent 2 it follows from the definition CLONED2 , as
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h1i and h2i are ordered consecutively in CLONED2 , and the fact that we use the
alternation policy to obtain BEST-ALLOC2.
We denote HGj = {hji1 , . . . , hjip} the lexicographically ordered set of half-houses allo-
cated to agent j, j = 1, 2. We show that utilities of these houses decrease monotonically
given this order.
PROPOSITION D.5. V1h1i1 > . . . > V1h1ip for h
1
i1
, . . . , h1ip ∈ HG1 .
PROOF. By contradiction, suppose that h1t′ is a half-house that violates the state-
ment: V1h1
t′−1
< V1h1
t′
. The equality is not possible as we have strict preferences over
houses. We denote t = t′ − 1 to simplify notations. From BESTEURESPONSEALGO, it
follows that h1t was added to J t from Jt = {h1t , h2t} at the stage t and h1ij′ was added
to J t′ from Jt′ = {h1t′ , h2t′} at the stage t′. As h1t 2 h1t′ , t < t′. In other words, h1t′ was
added to the BESTEURESPONSE after h1t . As V1h1t < V1h1t′ = V1h2t′ , h
2
t′ is also added to
J t′ at the stage t′. As h1t′ is half-house allocated to agent 1, h2t′ was removed from J t′′
at some later stage t′′. However, it can not be removed before h1t which has a smaller
utility. This leads to a contradiction as h1t ∈ BEST-ALLOC1 and h2t′ /∈ BEST-ALLOC1.
The next lemma shows that BEST-ALLOC1 is point-wise at most as good as
BEST-ALLOC2 with respect agent 2 preferences.
LEMMA D.6. BEST-ALLOC2(k) 2 BEST-ALLOC1(k) or BEST-ALLOC1(k) and
BEST-ALLOC2(k) are halves of the same house k = 1, . . . , 2m.
PROOF. By induction on the number of rounds. The base case holds trivially as
BEST-ALLOC2(1) is in {h11, h21} and h11 2 BEST-ALLOC1(1) or BEST-ALLOC1(1) = h11
and BEST-ALLOC2(1) = h21.
Assume that the statement holds for i− 1 rounds. Consider the ith round.
Suppose, by contradiction, h := BEST-ALLOC1(i) 2 BEST-ALLOC2(i) =: h′ and h
and h′ are not halves of the same house. As h and h′ are allocated houses at the ith
round then these houses are top preferences of agent 1 and agent 2, respectively, after
i − 1th round. As h 2 h′, there exists a round i′ < i such that h is the top preference
of agent 2 at this round. Moreover, h is available to agent 2 at this round as agent 1
only requests it at the ith round. Hence, h will be allocated to agent 2 at the i′th round.
This contradicts the assumption that h is allocated to agent 1.
The next result is the key result the section on computing the best EU response. We
consider half-houses GH1 = {h1i1 , . . . , h1ip} allocated to agent 1 and GH2 = {h2i1 , . . . , h2ip}
allocated to agent 2. GH1 and GH2 are lexicographically ordered. We show that, first,
h1i1 and h
2
i1
are allocated to agent 1 and agent 2, respectively, after that, h1i2 and h
2
i2
are
allocated and so on.
LEMMA D.7. Suppose houses in GH1 are allocated in rounds k1i1 , . . . , k
1
ip
and houses
in GH2 are allocated in rounds k2i1 , . . . , k
2
ip
. Then k1i1 < k
2
i1
< k1i2 < k
2
i2
< . . . < k1ip < k
2
ip
.
PROOF. By contradiction, suppose that h1t is the first half-house allocated to agent
1 that violates the statement so that k1t < k1t′ < . . . < k2t . In other words, first, agent
1 gets h1t at the k1t th round and h1t′ , which is a half of another house ht′ , at the k1t′th
round, and later agent 2 gets h2t at the k2t th round.
CLAIM 1. The following inequality holds:
h1t 2 h1t′ .
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PROOF. This follows from the fact that houses in BEST-ALLOC1 =
BESTEURESPONSE are lexicographically ordered and the fact that h1t is allocated
before h1t′ to agent 1.
CLAIM 2. The following inequality holds:
k2t < k
2
t′ .
PROOF. This follows from the structure CLONED2 and h1t 2 h1t′ (Claim 1).
From Claim 2 and our assumption hypothesis we have
k1t < k
1
t′ < . . . < k
2
t < k
2
t′ .
Suppose, hip and hiq are allocated to agent 1 at rounds k2t and k2t′ , respectively.
CLAIM 3. The following inequality holds:
h1t 2 h1t′ 2 hip 2 hiq.
PROOF. Follows from Claim 2, k1t < k1t′ < . . . < k2t < k2
′
t , and the fact that houses in
BEST-ALLOC1 = BESTEURESPONSE are lexicographically ordered.
We schematically show an allocation in the relevant rounds in the following table.
The top part of the table shows allocation at rounds k1t , k1t′ , k2t and k2
′
t . We use • to
indicate that a house is allocated at a certain round but its label is not important for
the proof.
Rounds
. . . k1t . . . k
1
t′ . . . k
2
t k
2
t + 1 . . . k
2
t′ − 1 k2t′ . . .
An allocation obtained from BESTEURESPONSEALGO
BEST-ALLOC1 {. . . h1t . . . h1t′ . . . hip • . . . • hiq . . .}
BEST-ALLOC2 {. . . • . . . • . . . h2t his . . . hir h2t′ . . .}
New allocation
BEST-ALLOC1 ∪ {h2t} \ {h1t′} {. . . h1t . . . h2t . . . h1p • . . . • h1q . . .}
BEST-ALLOC2 ∪ {h1t′} \ {h2t} {. . . • . . . • . . . his • . . . h1t′ h2t′ . . .}
Table III: A schematic representation of the proof of Claim 5
CLAIM 4. The following inequality holds:
V1h1t ≥ V1h1t′ .
PROOF. Follows from Claim 1 and Proposition D.5.
Next we show that agent 1 can improve his outcome by deviating from BEST-ALLOC1
and obtain a contradiction to the assumption that BEST-ALLOC1 is a best response.
CLAIM 5. If agent 1 requests h2t instead of h1t′ at the k1t′ round then agent 1 improves
its outcome.
PROOF. First, we note that h2t is available for agent 1 at the k1t′ round. Indeed, by our
assumption k1t′ < k2t , hence, the house h2t is available to agent 1 at round k1t′ . Second,
we show that even if agent 1 takes h2t instead of h1t′ at the k1t′th round, agent 1 can get
all houses BEST-ALLOC1 \ {h1t′}. This shows that agent 1 improves his outcome.
From Claim 3, h1t′ 2 hip. From the structure of CLONED2 we know that . . . 2 h1t′ 2
h2t′ 2 . . .. Hence, due to Lemma D.6, during rounds k2t , . . . , k2t′ − 1, the top houses of
agent 2 are ranked higher than hip in his profile. Also, the house h2t is not available
to agent 2 at the k2t round. Hence, agent 2 is allocated the same houses in rounds
k2t , . . . , k
2
t′ − 2 as he was allocated before the change during rounds k2t + 1, . . . , k2t′ − 1
(see the second part of the table above).
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Consider the round k2t′ − 1. As agent 1 was not allocated h1t′ at the k1t′th round, h1t′ is
available for agent 2 at the k2t′−1-th round. Hence, agent 2 is allocated h1t′ at the k2
′
t −1-
th round and h2t′ at the k2t′th round. The remaining rounds are identical to allocation
using BEST-ALLOC1. The new allocation of agent 1 is BEST-ALLOC1∪{h2t}\{h1t′} which
is strictly better than BEST-ALLOC1.
Claim 5 shows that agent 1 can improve his outcome and BESTEURESPONSE is not a
best response. This leads to a contradiction.
We denote BEST-ALLOC−11 (h2i ) the round when h2i is allocated.
Definition D.8. A pair BEST-ALLOC1 and BEST-ALLOC2 has the matching property
if and only if for each pair of half-houses h1i and h2i such that h1i ∈ BEST-ALLOC1 and
h2i ∈ BEST-ALLOC2, we have BEST-ALLOC−11 (h1i ) = BEST-ALLOC−12 (h2i ).
Example D.9. Consider BEST-ALLOC1 = {h11, h15, h25, h13, h16, h26} and
BEST-ALLOC2 = {h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}. These profiles have the matching prop-
erty as BEST-ALLOC−1 1(h11) = BEST-ALLOC
−1
2 (h
2
1) and BEST-ALLOC
−
1 1(h
1
3) =
BEST-ALLOC−12 (h23).
Consider BEST-ALLOC1 = {h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26} and BEST-ALLOC2 ={h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}. These profiles do not have the matching property as
BEST-ALLOC−1 1(h13) 6= BEST-ALLOC−12 (h23).
LEMMA D.10. For any BEST-ALLOC1 there exists BEST-ALLOC′1 that has the consec-
utivity property and such the pair BEST-ALLOC′1 and BEST-ALLOC2 has the matching
property. Moreover, the allocation obtained by agent 1 using BEST-ALLOC′1 is the same
as the allocation obtained using BEST-ALLOC1.
PROOF. We set BEST-ALLOC′1 = BEST-ALLOC1. Note that BEST-ALLOC
′
1 has the
consecutivity property as BEST-ALLOC1 does as by Proposition D.4 if a full-house of hi
is allocated to 1(2) then h1i and h2i are allocated to 1(2) in two consecutive rounds.
Suppose, the pair BEST-ALLOC′1 and BEST-ALLOC2 satisfies the statement up to
round k1t . As BEST-ALLOC
′
1 has the consecutivity property, only the matching property
can fail: h1t is allocated to agent 1 at the k1t round and h2t is allocated to agent 2 at the
k2t round and k1t < k2t .
We show that we can move h1t to round k2t and move all houses allocated during
round k1t + 1, . . . , k2t one round forward in BEST-ALLOC
′
1. These shifts preserve the
same allocation for agent 1 and agent 2 and the consecutivity property.
By Lemma D.7 we know that none of the half-houses are allocated to agent 1 during
rounds k1t +1, . . . , k2t . Hence, only full houses are allocated between these rounds. This
means that the number of rounds between k1t + 1 and k2t is even or 0.
We also observe that none of the half houses are allocated to agent 2 between rounds
k1t +1 and k2t as h2t is the first half-house allocated to agent 2 after round k1t . Moreover,
agent 2 is not allocated houses greater than h2t during rounds k1t + 1, . . . , k2t .
We move the house h1t to the position k2t and shift all houses in positions k1t + 1 and
k2t one round forward in BEST-ALLOC
′
1. Note that we preserve consecutivity property
as all halves are moved together.
After the move, agent 1 still gets the same houses in rounds k1t , . . . , k2t as shifted
houses are allocated even in earlier rounds compared to BEST-ALLOC1 and agent 1 is
allocated h1t in the same round as agent 2. Hence, allocations up to the round k2t are
identical for BEST-ALLOC1 and BEST-ALLOC
′
1 and both consecutivity and matching
properties hold.
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We repeat the argument for the next half-house that violates the statement.
Example D.11. BEST-ALLOC1 = {h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26} and BEST-ALLOC2 ={h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}. We do not need to move h11 as it is matched with h21. We move
h13 to the fourth round so that it is allocated at the same round as h23.
Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6
An allocation obtained from BESTEURESPONSEALGO
BEST-ALLOC1 {h11, h13, h15, h25, h16, h26}
BEST-ALLOC2 {h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}
New allocation with the matching property
BEST-ALLOC′1 {h11, h15, h25, h13, h16, h26}
BEST-ALLOC2 {h21, h12, h22, h23, h14, h24}
Table IV: A schematic representation of Example D.11.
A proof of Lemma D.10 gives an correctness argument for lines 5–8 in Algorithm 2.
In these lines we put half-houses allocated to agent 1 later in the ordering to ensure
that the matching property holds, i.e. agents obtain half-houses in the same rounds.
LEMMA D.12. Consider BEST-ALLOC1 and BEST-ALLOC2 that satisfy consecutiv-
ity and matching properties. Then there exists a preference CLONED-BEST1 over HCLONED
for agent 1 that has the consecutivity property and gives the same allocation as
BEST-ALLOC1.
PROOF. Given BEST-ALLOC1 that satisfies properties in the statement of the
lemma, we build a preference CLONED-BEST1 in the following way. We keep houses as
they are ordered in BEST-ALLOC1. For each half-house h1i allocated to agent 1 we rank
h2i right after h1i . We put houses that are not allocated to agent 1 in an arbitrary order,
keeping halves together, at the end of the profile. Note that inserting h2i after h1i does
not change the allocation as we know that h2i is allocated to agent 2 in the same round
as h1i is allocated to agent 1. Hence, h2i will never be the top element for agent 1 at any
round. Hence, CLONED-BEST1 gives the same allocation as BEST-ALLOC1.
A proof of Lemma D.12 provides a correctness argument for lines 11– 9 in Algorithm 2.
In these lines we move half-houses obtained by agent 2 right after corresponding half-
houses obtained by agent 2.
By Lemma 5.4, given CLONED-BEST1 which is the best response for CLONED2 , that sat-
isfies the consecutivity property, BEST1 obtained by the order-preserving join fromCLONED-BEST1 is the best response for 2 using PS.
THEOREM D.13. For the case of two agents and the PS rule, a DL best response and
an EU best response are equivalent.
PROOF. For two agents, PS assigns probabilities from the set {0, 1/2, 1}. Hence DL
preferences can be represented by the EU preferences where the utility are exponen-
tial: the utility of a more preferred house is twice the utility of the next preferred
house. Hence a response if a DL best response if it is an EU best response for exponen-
tial utilities. On the other we have shown that for two agents and the PS rule, an EU
best response is the same for any utilities compatible with the preferences. Hence for
two agents, an EU best response for any utilities is the same as the EU best response
for exponential utilities which in turn is the same as a DL best response.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
PROOF. Using a computer program we have found the following 15 step sequence
which leads to a cycling of the preference profile. We use U to denote the matrix of
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utilities of the agents over the items such that U [1][1] is the utility of agent 1 for house
h1. We use P to represent the reported profile of each agent, P [i][j] denotes the jth
most preferred house of agent i. Note that P starts as the truthful reporting in our
example. We use PS[i][j] to represent the fraction of house j that is eaten by agent i.
We use EU [i] to be the expected utility of agent i.
The initial preferences and utilities of the agents are
P0 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h6 h5
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h3 h6 h2 h1 h5 h4
)
U0 =
(
3 5 4 2 0 1
2 3 0 1 4 5
2 3 5 0 1 4
)
.
This yields the following allocation and utilities at the start
P0 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h6 h5
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h3 h6 h2 h1 h5 h4
)
PS0 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/4 3/4 1
1/2 0 1 1/4 1/4 0
)
EU0 =
(
7.5
8.25
6.25
)
.
In Step 1, agent 3 changes his report and improves his utility.
P1 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h6 h5
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h6 h3 h1 h2 h4 h5
)
PS1 =
(
5/12 1 1/4 1/3 0 0
1/6 0 0 1/3 1 1/2
5/12 0 3/4 1/3 0 1/2
)
EU1 =
(
7.9167
71667
6.5833
)
.
In Step 2, agent 1 changes his report in response.
P2 =
(
h3 h2 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h6 h3 h1 h2 h4 h5
)
PS2 =
(
1/24 7/8 3/4 1/3 0 0
1/24 1/8 0 1/3 1 1/2
11/12 0 1/4 1/3 0 1/2
)
EU2 =
(
8.1667
7.2917
5.0833
)
.
In Step 3, agent 3 again changes his report.
P3 =
(
h3 h2 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h3 h6 h2 h1 h5 h4
)
PS3 =
(
1/2 5/8 1/2 3/8 0 0
0 0 0 5/16 15/16 3/4
1/2 3/8 1/2 5/16 1/16 1/4
)
EU3 =
(
7.3750
7.8125
5.6875
)
.
In Step 4, agent 1 reacts again.
P4 =
(
h2 h1 h3 h4 h5 h6
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h3 h6 h2 h1 h5 h4
)
PS4 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/4 3/4 1
1/2 0 1 1/4 1/4 0
)
EU4 =
(
7.500
8.250
6.250
)
.
In Step 5, agent 3 reacts again.
P5 =
(
h2 h1 h3 h4 h5 h6
h6 h5 h2 h1 h4 h3
h6 h2 h3 h1 h4 h5
)
PS5 =
(
7/8 3/4 1/16 5/16 0 0
1/8 0 0 3/8 1 1/2
0 1/4 15/16 5/16 0 1/2
)
EU5 =
(
7.250
7.125
7.4375
)
.
In Step 6, agent 2 reacts.
P6 =
(
h2 h1 h3 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h1 h5 h3 h4
h6 h2 h3 h1 h4 h5
)
PS6 =
(
1/2 2/3 1/4 1/2 1/12 0
1/2 1/6 0 0 5/6 1/2
0 1/6 3/4 1/2 1/12 1/2
)
EU6 =
(
6.833
7.333
6.333
)
.
In Step 7, agent 3 reacts.
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P7 =
(
h2 h1 h3 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h1 h5 h3 h4
h6 h3 h1 h2 h5 h4
)
PS7 =
(
1/2 3/4 1/8 5/8 0 0
1/2 1/4 0 3/16 9/16 1/2
0 0 7/8 3/16 7/16 1/2
)
EU7 =
(
7.00
6.6875
6.8125
)
.
In Step 8, agent 1 changes his report.
P8 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h1 h5 h3 h4
h6 h3 h1 h2 h5 h4
)
PS8 =
(
5/24 3/4 3/8 2/3 0 0
7/12 1/4 0 1/6 1/2 1/2
5/24 0 5/8 1/6 1/2 1/2
)
EU8 =
(
7.2083
6.5833
6.0417
)
.
In Step 9, agent 2 reacts.
P9 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h5 h1 h3 h4
h6 h3 h1 h2 h5 h4
)
PS9 =
(
1/2 3/4 3/8 3/8 0 0
0 1/4 0 5/16 15/16 1/2
1/2 0 5/8 5/16 1/16 1/2
)
EU9 =
(
7.5
7.3125
6.1875
)
.
In Step 10, agent 3 reacts again.
P10 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h5 h1 h3 h4
h3 h1 h2 h5 h4 h6
)
PS10 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/4 3/4 1
1/2 0 1 1/4 1/4 0
)
EU10 =
(
7.5
8.25
6.25
)
.
In Step 11, agent 2 reacts.
P11 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h5 h2 h3 h6 h1 h4
h3 h1 h2 h5 h4 h6
)
PS11 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
1/2 0 1 1/2 0 0
)
EU11 =
(
7.5
9.0
6.0
)
.
In Step 12, agent 3 reacts.
P12 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h5 h2 h3 h6 h1 h4
h3 h2 h5 h6 h1 h4
)
PS12 =
(
2/3 1 0 1/3 0 0
1/6 0 0 1/3 1 1/2
1/6 0 1 1/3 0 1/2
)
EU12 =
(
7.6667
7.1667
7.3333
)
.
In Step 13, agent 2 reacts.
P13 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h3 h5 h1 h4
h3 h2 h5 h6 h1 h4
)
PS13 =
(
2/3 1 0 1/3 0 0
1/6 0 0 1/3 1/2 1
1/6 0 1 1/3 1/2 0
)
EU13 =
(
7.6667
7.6667
5.8333
)
.
In Step 14, agent 3 reacts again.
P14 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h6 h2 h3 h5 h1 h4
h3 h1 h2 h5 h4 h6
)
PS14 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/4 3/4 1
1/2 0 1 1/4 1/4 0
)
EU14 =
(
7.5
8.25
6.25
)
.
In Step 15, agent 2 reacts once more to agent 3.
P15 =
(
h2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h6
h5 h2 h3 h6 h1 h4
h3 h1 h2 h5 h4 h6
)
PS15 =
(
1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
1/2 0 1 1/2 0 0
)
EU15 =
(
7.5
9.0
6.0
)
.
This last step is the same profile as step 11, which means we have cycled.
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